The morning of October 16, and almost every other morning during the following weeks, began with a meeting at the White House to review the previous day’s take of photographic and other intelligence that had been processed overnight. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum photo Kennedy Addresses the Nation on the Crisis in Cuba, Oct. But in Moscow and Cuba, the U-2 flights and obvious monitoring of the merchant ships arriving from the USSR left the Soviet and Cuban leadership wondering, “what did the Americans know?”īut in Moscow and Cuba, the U-2 flights and obvious monitoring of the merchant ships arriving from the USSR left the Soviet and Cuban leadership wondering, “what did the Americans know?”Īs it turned out, the Americans knew a great deal more than the Soviets and Cubans suspected. The two R-14/SS-5 Skean Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) regiments were still at sea, as they were among the last of the Anadyr units scheduled to arrive and required a great deal of site preparation to be ready to fire. In Cuba itself, the Soviets were working hard to complete the Anadyr deployment, with particular emphasis on finishing the assembly and setup of the three MRBM regiments by the target date of Oct. The two weeks following the discovery of a Soviet R-12/SS-4 Sandal Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) regiment in Western Cuba of rapid, albeit discreet actions, negotiations and decisions, not all of which were helpful and/or productive in solving the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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